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STATE INTERESTS IN MARRIAGE,
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION, AND
CHOICE OF LAW
BRIAN H. Bixt
The Conference topic is the implication for interstate recognition
of marriage of recent court decisions that have led to legally recog-
nized same-sex marriages.' This article will approach the topic tan-
gentially, considering more generally some of the issues relating to
state regulation of marriage and family life. The article's initial focus
will be on federalism, and how it interacts with domestic relations pol-
icy, bracketing for the moment both current family law doctrinal rules
and constitutional constraints. Those latter concerns will then be
brought in, showing how certain additional complications result. The
article will then consider the ways in which recognizing party choice of
law might respond to some-but by no means all-of the problems in
this area.
One caveat: I do not purport to be an expert on constitutional is-
sues or on conflict of laws, and I generally defer on such matters to
those who are (including many at this Conference). The purpose of
this article is more to raise certain analytical and policy considera-
tions that underlie the current (and likely future) debates.
I. FEDERALISM, CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND NATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP
A. FEDERALISM: EXPERIMENTATION, LocAL CONTROL AND
COMPETITION
A certain view of federalism seems a natural fit with the regula-
tion of marriage and family life. This approach to federalism sees it as
a means of simultaneously allowing local control and encouraging the
development of alternative (and competing) approaches to a subject.
It is a commonplace that different communities-including different
communities within the United States today-have sharply different
ideas about marriage and family. We would not be surprised to hear
t Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minne-
sota. This paper was presented at the Conference, "The Implications of Lawrence and
Goodridge for the Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and the Validity of DOMA," held
at Catholic University in May 2004. I am grateful to the comments of participants at
the Conference.
1. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in Mass., N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2004, at Al.
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different attitudes expressed in New York City's Greenwich Village,
suburban Minneapolis, and Provo, Utah. It would seem natural, if not
inevitable, that the rules established for these different communities
would be as distinctly different as the communities themselves.
This ties in with a second argument often made for federalism:
that it encourages (or at least allows) states to act as "social laborato-
ries."2 If some communities have doubts about the claims being made
about the positive or negative consequences of a proposal (whether it
be recognizing same-sex marriage, allowing no-fault divorce, or chang-
ing the presumptions in custody cases), they can gain evidence on the
matter from nearby communities that have tried the proposal (not
that the "lessons" of real-world policies are always clear and uncon-
troversial: e.g., social scientists continue to debate what the effects
have been of no-fault divorce and capital punishment, just to name
two prominent examples). 3
As a policy matter, there is much to be said for decisions made at
a local level: it makes more sense to speak of the self-definition of a
small group than that of a much larger group (geographically or nu-
merically). It is far more likely that a township will closely share val-
ues and attitudes on cultural matters than an entire state.
Additionally, the costs of such self-definition would be less. If a person
or couple did not fit into a small community's self-definition, those ex-
cluded might only have to relocate a small distance away, in the next
community. If the definition were statewide, the relocation to the next
state would likely not be feasible for most people, given their work or
family obligations.
However, the history of American family law (in particular, Amer-
ican marriage law) has been one of state control, 4 though one should
also note some significant recent moves to federalize, directly or indi-
2. The standard reference here is Justice Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[ilt is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country").
3. On the economic consequences of the change to no-fault divorce, see, e.g., Doug-
las W. Allen, The Impact of Legal Reforms on Marriage and Divorce, in ANTONY W. DNES
& ROBERT ROWTHORN, EDS., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 191-
211 (Cambridge U. Pr. 2002) (summarizing and evaluating the empirical data). On the
deterrent effect of the death penalty, see, e.g., Jon Sorensen, et al., Capital Punishment
and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 481, 481-83 (1999) (summarizing competing studies on deterrence).
4. As one commentator stated: "[firom the earliest days of the Republic until the
recent past, family law has unquestionably belonged to the states." Anne C. Dailey,
Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821 (1995) (footnote omitted); see
also Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) (Holmes, J.) (relying on the
"common understanding" that domestic relations matters belonged exclusively to the
states to uphold the jurisdiction of a state court to hear a divorce suit brought against
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rectly,5 aspects of domestic regulation. This state-focus for American
family law might be seen as a contingent matter, an accident of his-
tory, though there may be historians who argue differently. In any
event, it would not have been entirely unworkable or contrary to the
express language of the Constitution for domestic regulation to have
been centered primarily at the national level or dispersed to the local
level, rather than placed at the state level, as it has been. Locating
lawmaking for marriage and divorce at the state level creates specific
policy advantages and policy problems, which should be kept in mind
when evaluating the options for interstate recognition of unusual mar-
riage laws.
As federalism involves different governments being allowed to
(and perhaps even encouraged to) develop different rules, one question
within discussions of federalism is whether "competition" will ensue
between the different governments, and what will be the consequences
of such competition 6-the extent to which federalism here might cre-
ate a dynamic of either "a race to the top" (competition for the qualita-
tively best or most efficient rules, with no negative effects on third
parties) or "a race to the bottom" (competition which leads to negative
effects, as when states competing for employers do so in a way that
decreases tax revenues for the state or that reduces protections for
citizens, consumers or employees). 7
Sometimes discussions of competitive federalism in marriage laws
is offered in terms of the financial incentives for offering a legal re-
gime that other states do not offer. Just as Nevada may have at-
tracted some visitors by the speed and the ease with which marriage
licenses and divorce judgments are granted,8 so too Jennifer Brown
long ago suggested that a state recognizing same-sex marriages might
an ambassador); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (describing domestic relations
as "an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States").
5. "Indirect" regulation occurs primarily through Congress's Spending Powers,
where the federal government makes the states' receipt of certain funds contingent on
meeting certain conditions. This has occurred, for example, with child support guide-
lines and adoption of UIFSA. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States'
Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (sum-
marizing some of the federal interventions in domestic relations law).
6. The economic literature on federalism tends to focus on the way that competi-
tion among local governments arguably permits public services to be dispersed more
efficiently. See, e.g., Truman Bewley, A Critique of Local Public Expenditures, 49
ECONOMETRICA 713 (1981); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956). For an excellent article tying this tradition to discussions of
federalism in family law, see Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Inter-
state Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 6, at 87-93 (summarizing races to the top and
bottom).
8. See id. at 88 (noting Nevada's high marriage rate, and tying it to that state's
efforts to promote marriage tourism).
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gain a tourist-based financial advantage from doing so. 9 The flip side
of this sort of competition is a different sort of "race to the bottom,"
whereby the competition between jurisdictions creates negative conse-
quences (or at least what are perceived by some to be negative conse-
quences) for parties outside the lawmaking states. 10 Thus, Utah
might consider it a negative externality of Massachusetts' decision to
authorize same-sex marriages if same-sex couples from Utah go to
marry in Massachusetts, and then return to Utah demanding recogni-
tion of the union." However, it is important to note that Massachu-
setts has legal rules significantly limiting the out-of-state spillover
effects of its same-sex marriages: under Massachusetts law, few out-
of-state residents would qualify for a same-sex marriage license.
12
Similarly, in the context of divorce laws, some states have added long
residency requirements (to the minimal jurisdictional requirement of
domicile), in part to "avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in
which another State has a paramount interest .... ,,13 As will be dis-
cussed in Part II, the "competitive federalism" aspects of permitting
party choice of law are significantly different.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOCTRINAL CONSTRAINTS
State policy-making in this area is, on one hand, constrained by
constitutional limitations that encourage national citizenship, 14 and,
on the other hand, both constrained and undermined by current rules
and practices relating to conflict of laws.
9. Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995); cf. Gary Lee, Gay Travel:
Where the Rites Get Respected/Toronto Develops a Thriving Business Climate Catering
to Same-Sex Weddings, NEWSDAY, March 21, 2004 (discussing how Toronto has gained
tourist dollars through Ontario's legalization of same-sex marriage).
10. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 6, at 87 (discussing that form of "race to the
bottom").
11. For a discussion of this aspect of federalism, using the examples of physician-
assisted suicide, same-sex marriage, and medical marijuana, see Brian H. Bix, Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide and Federalism, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53
(2003).
12. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (2003 & Supp. 2004). This law forbids
access to same-sex marriage for out-of-state residents if the marriage would be void if
contracted in their home jurisdiction-a list of jurisdictions which would seem to in-
clude at least the 39 states that have barred, through legislation or state constitutional
provision, recognition of same-sex marriages. See Bob von Sternberg, Foes of Gay Mar-
riage Press for More Bans, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Dec. 26, 2004 (noting that Min-
nesota is one of 39 states that have passed state "mini-DOMAs").
13. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) (upholding Iowa's one-year residency
requirement).
14. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Uncon-
stitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1986 (1997) (describing the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as "one of a bundle of provisions incorporated into the Consti-
tution to bind states more closely together").
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The general rule-grounded primarily in principles of conflict of
laws, only occasionally codified in state statutes, and usually not
thought to have constitutional status-is that a marriage will be rec-
ognized if it was valid where contracted.15 This means that a state's
efforts to make marriage policy by restricting who can marry or by
putting conditions on marriage can often be circumvented by the sim-
ple expedient of marrying in another state, and then having that out-
of-state marriage recognized in-state. 16 There are some limits on this
general principle, limits that restore some of the home state's author-
ity. Under traditional conflict of laws rules, states have the right to
refuse to recognize marriages celebrated in another state or country, if
that marriage is contrary to the forum state's strong public policy.
1 7
Additionally, a handful of states have a "marriage evasion act," which
works to refuse recognition to an out-of-state marriage if the couple
went to another state with the purpose of evading the restrictions
within the home state's marriage laws.18 An inverse regulation, not
allowing out-of-state residents to marry if the marriage would be void
if contracted in the couple's home jurisdiction, is law in Massachu-
setts, and has played a role in recent debates about same-sex mar-
riages in that state. 19 Such rules reflect the general principle that the
moral case looks different: (1) for the recognition of marriages con-
tracted elsewhere when the couples seeking recognition were mar-
rying under their home state rules, and are now seeking recognition
elsewhere only because career or family has required them to relocate;
and (2) as against people who are seeking recognition of out-of-state
marriages despite long-term connections to the forum state and the
clear contrary policy of the forum state.20
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (stating the gen-
eral rule that a "marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the mar-
riage was contracted will everywhere be recognized"); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 289-95 (4th ed. 2001) (summarizing the general
rule).
16. See id. The fact that states celebrating marriage need not have any connection
with the parties marrying-as contrasted with states performing divorce, where at least
one of the parties must be a domiciliary of the state-is thought to justify the greater
respect due foreign divorce decrees as contrasted with foreign marriage ceremonies.
See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on
Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191, 194-95 (1996).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 15, at § 283(2); WEIN-
TRAUB, supra note 15, at 289-95.
18. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207 § 10 (2003 & Supp. 2004); see generally
EUGENE F. SCOLES, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.13, at 564-565; § 15-16, at 626-27 &
n.5 (3d ed. 2000).
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (2003 & Supp. 2004); see Pam Belluck,
Romney Won't Let Gay Outsiders Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2004, at
1.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 15, at § 283(2)
(stating an exception to the general validity of out-of-state marriages, valid where cele-
20051
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Divorce can occur, as a matter of jurisdiction, 2 1 in any state in
which one of the two spouses is domiciled, even if the current domicile
state(s) do not coincide with where the couple was married or lived
together. 2 2 Additionally, the practice of states applying their own di-
vorce rules to cases before them, even if the cases involve marriages
where the couples were married and lived almost their entire married
life in another state, undermines the ability of states to pursue their
policies. 23 Where a state's view on marriage is expressed in large part
through its rules for when divorce will be granted and the terms on
which it will be granted, those policies are weakened when parties can
effectively change the terms of divorce by simply moving to another
state. This issue has been discussed, for example, in the context of
covenant marriage laws: a couple could enter a covenant marriage in
Louisiana, Arkansas, or Arizona,2 4 thereby agreeing to certain restric-
tions on the grounds and terms for seeking divorce, but it appears
that, under current doctrinal practices and understandings, another
state would not be bound to hold the parties to those terms.2 5
brated, for marriages that "violate the strong public policy of another state which had
the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the
marriage"); see also Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 949-62 (1998) (noting a similar distinction historically in the
treatment of miscegenation cases when interstate recognition questions arose); Patrick
J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of
Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 185 (1998) (expressing the view
that in such cases "many states will give some effect to same-sex marriages even if they
don't give them full effect"). One can complicate the question further, and add examples
of a couple seeking recognition of its marital status for events occurring during a brief
vacation in another state, or a couple validly married in one state bringing a lawsuit in
a second state that would not recognize the marriage and the marital status is central to
some aspect of the suit, see Borchers, supra, at 180-81 (using that example in the con-
text of a discussion of DOMA). Such examples are meant to modify our thinking about
this situation: to show how it will sometimes not so much be a Massachusetts (or Ver-
mont or Hawaii) imposing its views on other states, but other states interfering with the
legal decisions made by Massachusetts regarding its own citizens.
21. Most states also have statutory waiting periods, that require petitioners to
have been resident in the state for some period of time (frequently, six months or a year)
before they can bring a divorce action. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Re-
view of the Year in Family Law: Children's Issues Remain the Focus, 37 FAM. L.Q. 527,
580 (2004) (summarizing the statutory waiting periods in all jurisdictions).
22. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
23. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 15, at 296 (summarizing the usual practice).
24. See ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000 & Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (2002 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272 to 9:276
(2000 & Supp. 2005).
25. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage
and the Law of Conflicts of Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1085, 1100-20 (1999) (summariz-
ing current practices and understandings, but urging reform).
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The constitutional constraints include, most prominently, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 26 but also the right to interstate travel found
in the Fourteenth Amendment (which at least one Court decision has
grounded in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of that amend-
ment).27 The Full Faith and Credit Clause seems to encourage the
recognition and enforcement in other states of rights granted in a sis-
ter state.2 8 The right to interstate travel has been held to discourage
states from treating recent immigrants from another state differently
from the way long-time residents are treated.2 9
The extent to which the Full Faith and Credit Clause actually
constrains state action in this area is notoriously unsettled. What is
settled is that divorce judgments in one state are binding on another
state, at least where the first state properly had jurisdiction over the
marriage. 30 As already noted, because jurisdiction comes with the
domicile of either partner, it is possible for a state that had no signifi-
cant connection with the celebration of the marriage or the life of the
couple to have jurisdiction to grant the divorce. What is not clear is
whether the clause has any application to marriage.3 1 It is well set-
tled that states are strictly bound regarding the treatment of out-of-
state judgments, but relatively free regarding the application of out-
of-state law to a dispute before them.3 2 Marriage is something less
than a legal judgment, entered by a third-party adjudicator after hear-
ing interested parties present adversarial positions 3 3 (most marriages
26. The Constitution states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
27. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-04 (1999) (barring states from paying new re-
sidents lower welfare benefits than longtime residents).
28. I recognize that there is historical evidence that the Framers may have in-
tended a narrower, merely evidentiary role for the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See,
e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998) (offering detailed
evidence for the Framers' having had a narrow understanding of the clause). However,
whatever the merits of this reading of history, the Supreme Court very early began to
read that clause much more broadly. See Borchers, supra note 20, at 158-59 (discussing
the cases).
29. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that state cannot deny
welfare assistance to residents who lived in a state less than one year); Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999) (barring states from paying new residents lower welfare benefits
than long-time residents).
30. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
31. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 20, at 164-72 (arguing that the clause does not
apply to marriages); Kramer, supra note 14, at 1976-99 (indicating that the clause does
apply to marriages, albeit in a limited way).
32. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494-95 (2003); Borchers, supra note
20, at 158-79.
33. See Borchers, supra note 20, at 164-67 (discussing the justifications for treating
judgments differently under Conflict of Laws and Full Faith and Credit purposes).
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are not adversarial-at least at the beginning, at least at the stage of
filing for a license). However, marriage is something more than the
question of which state's laws should apply to some case before the
court. Marriage is a status conferred by a prior action of an author-
ized official. As a question regarding a status conferred by a sister
state, the claim for recognition is stronger than asking a second state
to recognize a hunting or fishing license granted in the first state.34
We rightfully think of hunting and fishing licenses as permission to
undertake a certain activity only within a geographical area; we usu-
ally do not think of our marital status as rights and duties that apply
only within a confined geographical area-though maybe, with cur-
rent developments, this is exactly how we will have to begin to think.
Another unsettled issues is whether the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA")35 is consistent with (and authorized by) the second part of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 36 These questions, though of obvi-
ous importance, are beyond the scope of this article.
The right to interstate travel also has its limits. In Sosna v.
Iowa,3 7 the Supreme Court held that Iowa's interest in not interfering
with marriages from other states was sufficient to justify a one-year
residency requirement for divorce actions, even though such a require-
ment could be said to burden a citizen's "right to interstate travel."38
In summary, and to put the matter in the broadest terms, the val-
ues of federalism, including local control and experimentation, are in
an ongoing tension with the values of national citizenship.
II. STATE INTERESTS AND PARTY CHOICE OF LAW
In a previous article, I argued that recognizing party choice of law
in marriage and divorce law might, paradoxically, increase states'
ability to serve their chosen objectives in family law. 39 The idea of
party choice of law is that the parties to some transaction or interac-
tion are allowed to choose which state's laws govern those transac-
34. Cf id. at 167, 171 (using that example).
35. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (1997 &
Supp. 2004); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2000)).
36. See, e.g., Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground
for Same Sex Marriage, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2684 (2004) (summarizing arguments
against the validity of DOMA); Whitten, supra note 28, at 346-91 (summarizing and
responding to arguments that DOMA is unconstitutional); cf Andrew Koppelman,
Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IowA L.
REV. 1 (1997) (arguing for the unconstitutional status of DOMA because of its intent,
rather than on the basis of a reading of Full Faith and Credit Clause).
37. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
38. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409 (1975).
39. Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 FAM. L.Q. 255 (2001)
[hereinafter, Bix, Choice of Law].
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tions or interactions. 40 While the ability to choose a set of laws
coming from a state that might have no other connection with the par-
ties or the transaction may at first seem unusual, this can be seen as
merely a variation on the parties' right to choose (at least in commer-
cial transactions), through express contractual language, individual
standards to govern their own transactions (e.g., the definition of key
terms, standards for determining when another party would be in
breach, limitations on recoverable damages, and agreements to send
disputes to arbitration).
The idea of allowing party choice of law for marriage and divorce
regulation also has an obvious connection with the significant amount
of party choice already recognized in different kinds of marriage-cen-
tered agreements. Premarital agreements that seek to affect the fi-
nancial terms in case of divorce were once considered void as against
public policy, in part because they altered the state-established status
rules for marriage. 4 1 However, such agreements are now enforceable
in all jurisdictions (though many jurisdictions subject the agreements
to tests of substantive and procedural fairness).4 2 Parties about to
marry now have considerable power-though far from plenary
power-to alter the property rules that apply to their marriage, and
the principles of property division and alimony that will apply should
they get divorced. 43 This power generally ends when the agreement
extends to financial obligations between the parties and tries to affect,
for example, child custody, visitation, child support, or the grounds for
divorce. 4 4
Separation agreements, by which parties about to end their mar-
riage agree beyond the financial (and other) terms upon which their
union will be dissolved, have always received favorable treatment by
the courts,4 5 as they save court time, decrease the rancor of divorce,
40. For a good overview of party choice of law in a commercial law setting, see
Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L.
REV. 363 (2003).
41. The other (and related) justification given for non-enforcement was that such
agreements, if enforceable, would encourage divorce. On the history of the enforceabil-
ity of premarital agreements, see Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The
Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WILLIAM
& MARY L. REV. 145, 148-58 (1998) [hereinafter, Bix, Bargaining].
42. See id. at 153-58.
43. See LAURA W. MORGAN & BRErT R. TURNER, ATTACKING AND DEFENDING MARI-
TAL AGREEMENTS 361-481 (ABA 2001) (offering an overview of the enforceability of pre-
marital agreements); Bix, Bargaining, supra note 41, at 150-58.
44. See MORGAN & TURNER, supra note 43, at 379-93 (summarizing some of the
'public policy" limitations to premarital agreement enforceability).
45. However, in most jurisdictions, a distinction is drawn between the terms cover-
ing property division and alimony, on one hand, where the separation agreement's
terms will usually be held to bind the court, and be subject to revision only in extraordi-
nary circumstances, and, on the other hand, terms regarding child custody, visitation,
2005]
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and have the potential of establishing terms that the parties them-
selves will be more content to live with. With premarital and separa-
tion agreements, parties about to marry or about to end their
marriage are given significant authority to set or to alter the default
terms of marriage set by the state.
My discussion in the earlier choice of law article considered the
possibility that couples about to marry would have the right to choose
the set of rules governing marriage and any dissolution (divorce or
annulment), from among the rules passed in any American jurisdic-
tion, with this choice of law being enforced even if the couple subse-
quently moved to another state, and even if one partner later filed for
divorce in another jurisdiction. 4 6 The advantages of allowing couples
to choose a package of rules, rather than potentially having different
state's rules cover the various aspects of their married life, is that (1) a
more consistent set of principles would apply, rather than potentially
having one state's divorce policies undermine another state's marriage
policies,4 7 and (2) couples could more effectively choose the set of rules
that best fit their needs and preferences.
As others have argued, 48 the current approach of most courts,
conflating jurisdiction with choice of law (that is, courts generally ap-
plying the forum state law for marital cases once they determine that
a domestic relations case is properly before them), creates unfortunate
consequences and should be rethought. Express choice of law provi-
sions, if generally enforced, would ensure that domestic relations poli-
cies-the domestic relations policies of some U.S. jurisdiction-were
consistently applied, while also responding to the virtues of party
choice.
While the rules of marital property (including the control over
property during the marriage, and the principles of division upon dis-
solution) are thought to have significant effects on choices relating to
marriage and divorce (as well as gender equality),49 under current
doctrine and practice, determining the rules to apply is notoriously
and child support, where the court will usually be held to have a duty to review the
agreement, without deference, to make sure that the best interests of the child(ren) are
being protected. See, e.g., MORGAN & TURNER, supra note 43, at 33-63 (offering an over-
view of some enforcement issues for separation agreements).
46. Bix, Choice of Law, supra note 39, at 262-71. To be put into effect, this proposal
would likely require federal legislation or uniform state legislation. See id. at 265-66.
47. As would occur, for example, were a covenant marriage to be dissolved under
state laws that did not enforce the commitments entered under that marital form. See
supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
48. See Spaht & Symeonides, supra note 25, at 1102-17.
49. See, e.g., Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 75 (2004) (arguing for a change in marital property rules to encourage
more egalitarian marriages).
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messy when a couple has lived in more than one state and those states
have differing marital property regimes. 50
The point of confining the parties' choice of laws to rules enacted
by some American jurisdiction is the guess that requiring that the pol-
icies have been passed by some American legislative body will offer
some level of protection from exploitation for weaker parties, and will
also offer some protection to third parties-particularly children.5 1
A strategy comparable to free choice of law among established
state laws has been suggested by Larry Ribstein at this Conference: 52
for couples about to marry to be able to choose between a series of
"standard forms," each of which would bundle marital rights and obli-
gations in a way that would serve the interests of some couples while
protecting individuals entering such relationships from exploitation. 53
It is important to contrast the "competitive federalism" aspects of
party choice of law with those under systems with more limited choice
of law. As discussed in Part I.A., above, federalism systems often have
to worry about the "spillover" effects of one state's laws on other
states, and whether a dynamic might develop that will create a "race
to the bottom." Spillover effects can be minimized where there are
requirements of domiciliary status or durational residency
requirements.
However, there is a different type of cost one might consider: the
cost that inefficient or unjust laws, perhaps supported by some well-
organized interest group, can impose on the citizens (and businesses)
of the state where the laws are passed. As two prominent commenta-
tors have noted: "[a]n important effect of permitting free choice of law
is to improve state rules and regulations by reducing interest groups'
incentives to promote inefficient laws."54 Recognizing party choice of
50. For a brief overview, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS:
AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL-CASES AND MATERIALS 404-10 (2d ed. 2003);
SCOLES, supra note 18, at 577-606. There is also a problem where a couple is married
under one set of laws, and the state later changes its stance on policy matters and
greatly modifies the law (e.g., when states moved from fault to no-fault divorce). Courts
nearly always apply the marriage and divorce law then in effect, not the law under
which a couple was wed. See Bix, Choice of Law, supra note 39, at 261.
51. See Bix, Choice of Law, supra note 39, at 269-70.
52. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach to Same-Sex Marriage, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 309 (2005).
53. See id. For a discussion in the context of commercial law of why a small num-
ber of standard forms would have advantages over a wider range of party-constructed
choices, see, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories
and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 369 (1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Making Sense
of Entity Rationalization, 58 Bus. LAw. 1023 (2003).
54. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom,
in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 325 (F. H. Buckley ed. Duke,
1999); see also Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice
of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000) (offering a similar argument).
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law empowers transactors to avoid laws that would be harmful or in-
appropriate for their case, and to seek out more appropriate or more
just laws.
Of course, a regime of broad party choice of law cannot distin-
guish parties avoiding inefficient or unjust forum state laws from par-
ties avoiding fair, necessary and protective forum state laws. If one is
concerned about the protection of parties who cannot protect them-
selves (most obviously children, but also some vulnerable spouses and
spouses-to-be), then one must either trust (or hope) that no state's
laws fall below the minimal standard of protection, or have some
mechanism for refusing party choice of law where the effects would be
too dire. 5 5
Whether one constrains the menu of options by available legisla-
tively enacted alternatives or by established "standard forms" (ap-
proved at some point, one assumes, by a legislature, court, or agency),
it does not mean that one necessarily puts all trust in legislatures or
other public officials. It is too late in the day to believe that such
sources are always immune from incompetence or improper influence.
However, one can assume that a public evaluation of alternatives will
at least be likely to exclude the most one-sided or exploitative arrange-
ments, arrangements that might otherwise be entered by some
couples and later enforced if there were no limits on private
agreements. 56
There is of course an obvious sense in which recognizing party
choice of law might undermine certain federalism values. It would be
obvious that a state could not impose its ideas about marriage on all of
its citizens. However, as already discussed (above, in Part I.B.), the
conflict of laws rules for marriage and divorce mean that state control
over the marital rules for its citizens is already limited. By contrast,
proposals that recognize a couple's "choice of law" might in some ways
strengthen the states' ability to promote certain ideas about marriage
and family. It seems particularly useful to support the ideas and in-
terests behind proposals like the covenant marriage laws. 57 However,
55. Even O'Hara and Ribstein, in their strong advocacy of party choice of law, find
a place for restrictions on party choice. Controversially, however, they believe that such
"public policy" judgments should be made by legislatures, not courts. See O'Hara &
Ribstein, supra note 54, at 1194-96.
56. One might argue that one does not need to constrain choice in this way, be-
cause the normal doctrinal defenses of contract law-unconscionability, undue influ-
ence, duress, misrepresentation, and lack of good faith-would be available to defeat
enforcement of egregiously one-sided agreements. See, e.g., Bix, Bargaining, supra note
41, at 182-92 (considering the availability of conventional contract defenses for regulat-
ing premarital agreements). However, as these doctrines are often construed quite nar-
rowly, some might think them insufficient protection against one-sided premarital
agreements.
57. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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whatever its other merits, this approach has no ready answer to the
problem of states having sharply different ideas about what sorts of
unions to recognize; e.g., where one or more states recognizes same-
sex unions or polygamous groups, or marriages by a couple quite
young or who are first cousins, but other states strongly oppose such
recognition. I turn in the next section to consider these sorts of
situations.
III. MIGRATORY COUPLES: FEDERALISM VS. NATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP
What of the same-sex couple who wish to marry, but who live in a
state that strongly opposes the recognition of same-sex marriage? In
what sense would a "party choice of law solution" work to resolve the
conflict between what the couple seeks and the state's policy? To al-
low a couple in North Dakota, who are not allowed to marry under its
laws (because one of them is 15 years old, because they are first cous-
ins, or because they are both men) to gain marital status by simply
agreeing to be subject to the laws of another state where they could
marry, would simply allow vast and simple evasion of state policy.
If there is an insight of the party choice of law approach that can
survive the reality of states having sharply differing ideas about
which unions to recognize, it is that there is a contractual element to
marriage-an important element of marriage, though far less than
the full public status and traditional institution that is "marriage"-
and that this element perhaps should be more available, as a limited
set of legal rights and obligations, to couples who choose them.
Consider a stronger set of facts for recognition: couples who val-
idly marry under the rules of one state, but then relocate 58 to a state
in which their marriage would not have been allowed. As already dis-
cussed, considerations of national citizenship and the right to travel
argue strongly in favor of recognizing their union, while considera-
tions of federalism seem to argue against. Frank Buckley and Larry
Ribstein recently offered a compromise solution, whereby states would
recognize the "contractual" or "inter se" aspects of marriage, but could
refuse marital-based claims upon the state. 5 9 This carries a certain
logic to it: that one can view the same-sex (or polygamous) union en-
tered in another state as being, at a minimum, a kind of (form) con-
58. For the purpose of this discussion, I will assume "neutral" or "legitimate" rea-
sons for relocation, like a job relocation, a job opportunity, family obligations, or the
like. It is possible that some motivations for relocation (e.g., a kind of reverse "marriage
evasion'-a move merely to challenge the state policies in another state) might raise
different questions or justify different policy conclusions.
59. F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 561.
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tract entered between the parties, and that this contract should be
recognized by other jurisdictions.
As a matter of policy (extending between current contractual and
choice of law doctrinal analysis), one might argue for a slight exten-
sion of the Buckley/Ribstein category of minimal recognition. If one
views simple inter-party claims as being on one side of a spectrum,
and the right to certain governmental benefits (rights that would cost
the state(s) money) as being on the other side, there are certain claims
in the middle that need consideration: claims recognized by third par-
ties because of the government's recognition of a couple's status.
These include matters like whether one gets to visit a life companion
in the hospital, and, if necessary, make medical decisions for that com-
panion. One can achieve some of these sorts of claim-rights through
contract, or contract-like documents (living wills, durable powers of
attorney, etc.), but some of these rights may be hard or impossible to
create through private documents, because they involve another insti-
tution's (in this case, a hospital's) deference to the state recognition of
a relationship.
Of course, the argument for extending recognition to this addi-
tional set of rights and obligations depends on a balancing between
the objection the state has to (recognizing) a type of relationship and
the interests protected in a partial recognition. This is a balance that,
in principle, might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even
from one type of right to another (and needless to say, different ob-
servers might come to a different balance over the same set of facts).
For example, one might think the "humanitarian" argument strong
enough for rights of hospital visitation and decision-making to over-
come all but the strongest public-policy oppositions to same-sex rela-
tionships, but that the balance might come out differently with an
argument requesting companies to offer insurance coverage to part-
ners or to make such partners presumptive beneficiaries.
Additionally, most states do not consider parental rights and obli-
gations as something that can be created, modified, or waived by con-
tractual agreement alone. 60 This is reflected by the reluctance of
many state courts to recognize parental rights for a member of a
same-sex couple who has helped to raise a child, but who is not the
child's biological parent, even if the couple had entered a detailed
agreement that both partners should have the rights and obligations
60. The effect of separation agreements is frequently to modify, or at least clarify,
parental rights regarding custody, visitation, and child support, but these agreements
are subject to judicial approval or disapproval, with the general understanding that the
provisions regarding children are to be tested for reasonableness, with no deference
given to the parties' choices. See, e.g., MORGAN & TURNER, supra note 43, at 33-163
(offering an overview of rules regarding the enforcement of separation agreements).
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of a parent.6 1 Recognizing this status (from a valid same-sex mar-
riage or civil union in another state) is not a matter of state benefit (at
least not directly or primarily), but is a matter of state recognition of a
status agreed between the parties, and recognized in another
jurisdiction.
To be clear: I am not arguing that any of the solutions discussed
in this section (or generally in this paper) are required by a proper
reading of the United States Constitution (on its own, or in combina-
tion with Conflict of Laws principles and various federal and state
statutes). The arguments I present are mostly at the level of policy
and principle.
CONCLUSION
As indicated, the discussions in the prior section, and throughout
the paper, are not advocated as solutions required by current law and
doctrine. Rather, they are meant to respond to the values of federal-
ism and national citizenship that underlie relevant constitutional pro-
visions, even if the proper application of those provisions (based on the
historical understanding of those provisions, their development
through judicial interpretations, or the like) would require something
less or something different. Additionally, the conclusions are meant to
respond to the additional values of autonomy and efficiency that party
choice of law has been shown to serve, while still respecting, to a con-
siderable extent, the right of state communities to define themselves.
61. See, e.g., In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) (refusing to en-
force co-parenting agreement on the grounds that it violated public policy).
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